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The participants in the 2014 Duke Law Journal Administrative 
Law Symposium came to three important conclusions. First, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of Treasury 
(Treasury) have been systematically declining to act in accordance 
with the duties imposed on them by the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) for many decades.1 Second, courts should require the IRS 
and Treasury to comply with the APA.2 Third, the Supreme Court has 
signaled its intent to “take administrative law to tax”—as suggested 
by the title of this symposium—by requiring the IRS and Treasury to 
comply with the APA.3 I agree with Professor Steve Johnson that the 
duty to explain why it has taken an action is one of the most 
important duties that the APA imposes on the IRS and Treasury.4 I 
am concerned, however, that the agencies that implement tax laws 
lack the resources required to comply with the demands of the APA, 
as those demands have been interpreted, expanded, and applied by 
courts. 
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 1. See generally Amandeep S. Grewal, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE L.J. 
1625 (2014) (examining scholarship that discusses whether, and to what degree, the reasoned-
explanation requirement of the APA should apply to the IRS and Treasury). 
 2. Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771, 
1773 (2014).  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. at 1774. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, Professor 
Johnson provides a valuable service by describing the nature of the 
explanations that the IRS would likely be required to provide when it 
issues decisions in many types of common tax disputes.5 Professor 
Johnson estimates that the IRS makes between fifty thousand and 
fifty million decisions in informal adjudications each year.6 If courts 
begin to apply the APA arbitrary-and-capricious standard to IRS 
decisions that resolve adjudicatory disputes, the IRS might believe 
that it is required to provide an explanation of the type Professor 
Johnson describes every time it adjudicates such tax disputes. If the 
IRS were to attempt to provide a statement of reasons sufficient to 
satisfy a reviewing court to support each of those decisions, its ability 
to implement our system of taxation would be severely impaired. The 
resources available to the IRS are nowhere near sufficient to satisfy 
the judicially imposed version of the duty to engage in reasoned 
decisionmaking in every case in which the IRS adjudicates a tax 
dispute. Fortunately, the IRS has other much less burdensome 
options it can take if courts begin to apply the APA to the IRS 
decisions made in adjudications. 
Professor Johnson offers the key to understanding the wide 
range of options available to the IRS when he notes that all IRS 
adjudications are informal adjudications under the APA.7 As he then 
discusses, § 553 to § 558 of the APA do not require an agency to use 
any decisionmaking procedures when it engages in informal 
adjudication. The Supreme Court has held that only APA § 555 
applies to informal adjudications.8 That section, appropriately titled 
“Ancillary Matters,” does not require an agency to state reasons for 
its actions except in the case of a decision to deny a written petition. 
None of the common types of informal IRS adjudications described 
by Professor Johnson qualify as denials of a written petition. Thus, 
the IRS is not required to provide a statement of the reasons for any 
action it takes in an adjudication. Furthermore, no court can hold that 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. In response to my question during the Symposium, Professor Johnson estimated that 
the number of such adjudications would be between fifty thousand and fifty million. His article 
describes the many contexts in which the IRS engages in informal adjudication. Johnson, supra 
note 2, at 1793–1833. 
 7. Id. at 1779.  
 8. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655–56 (1990). 
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the IRS has committed a procedural error by refusing to provide such 
a statement. If a taxpayer seeks judicial review of an action the IRS 
has taken in an adjudication, arguing that the action is an arbitrary-
and-capricious violation of APA § 706, a court can require the IRS to 
provide a statement of its reasons for acting as it did. As a result, the 
court would have a basis to apply the arbitrary-and-capricious test 
even if the agency did not provide a contemporaneous statement of 
reasons adequate to allow a court to apply the arbitrary-and-
capricious test to the agency action.9 
It follows that the IRS could pursue a range of options in 
adjudications. First, the IRS might provide no contemporaneous 
statement of reasons for any action and be prepared to provide such a 
statement only if the action is the subject of a review petition. Second, 
the IRS could provide only a brief contemporaneous statement of 
reasons for each action and be prepared to provide a more detailed 
statement if and when a review petition is filed. Finally, the IRS could 
provide a contemporaneous statement of reasons only for actions that 
it expects will be subject to a review petition, but be prepared to 
provide such a statement in any other case that is the subject of a 
review petition. Given the range of available options—and the 
relatively small number of actions taken by the IRS in adjudications 
likely to be subject to review petitions—I suspect that the IRS would 
find a way to comply with the APA in this context. This method of 
compliance would likely avoid stretching the IRS’s scarce resources 
beyond the breaking point should courts begin to apply the APA to 
actions it takes in adjudications. 
I am much more concerned about the potential results of judicial 
applications of the APA to tax rules issued by the IRS and Treasury. 
In a 2007 article, Professor Kristin Hickman argued persuasively that 
the IRS and Treasury issue an average of thirty-two tax rules per year 
that the agencies fail to subject to the notice-and-comment procedure 
described in APA § 553.10 I agree that the IRS should use the notice-
and-comment procedure to issue those rules but also recognize that 
the procedure consumes a lot of time and agency resources. For 
instance, Professors Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, and Lisa 
 
 9. See id. at 645–47, 653–56 (describing and explaining this process). 
 10. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1727, 1748 (2007) (finding ninety-five rulemaking projects over a three-year period that 
did not follow traditional APA procedures). 
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Peters found that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
required approximately 5.5 years to issue each of ninety rules 
implementing the Air Toxic Emission Standards.11 Most of the rules 
Wagner, Barnes, and Peters studied were not economically significant 
rules, that is, rules that are expected to have an annual effect on the 
economy of at least $100 million.12 Many other studies have found 
that issuance of a rule through use of the notice-and-comment process 
takes much longer and requires a much greater commitment of 
agency resources if the rule is economically significant. For instance, 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA’s) 
passive restraint rule required almost twenty years to issue and 
consumed such a high proportion of NHTSA’s resources that the 
agency largely abandoned rulemaking as a means of implementing its 
highway safety mission.13 Similarly, despite devoting significant 
resources to interstate pollution transport rulemaking for more than 
two decades, the EPA has still not been able to issue an interstate 
pollution transport rule that can satisfy the courts.14 
The time- and resource-consuming effects of the notice-and-
comment procedure are often described under the heading of 
rulemaking ossification.15 Ossification has many adverse effects, 
including: delay in issuing important rules; failure to issue important 
rules; diversion of scarce agency resources from other important 
tasks; substitution of inferior methods of implementing a statutory 
mission; and failure to amend or to rescind rules for many years after 
 
 11. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An 
Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 143–45 (2011) 
(noting that the EPA begins requesting technical information an average of four years before 
the publication of the proposed rule and produces a final rule about 1.5 years after publication 
of the proposed rule). 
 12. Id. at 145; see Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (1993), reprinted as 
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. (2012) (including in the definition of “significant regulatory 
action” a regulatory action that will “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or 
more”); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 (2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4 (classifying “significant regulatory actions as 
defined by section 3(f)(1)” of Executive Order 12866 as “economically significant”). 
 13. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 207–
16 (1990) (discussing NHTSA’s struggles with the rulemaking process). 
 14. The D.C. Circuit described the lengthy history of this rulemaking in EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 24 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 15. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the 
Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493 (2012) (noting that rule ossification 
“mean[s] that it takes a long time and an extensive commitment of agency resources to use the 
notice and comment process [of the APA] to issue a rule”). 
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they have become obsolete.16 If the IRS and Treasury are required to 
use the notice-and-comment process to issue thirty-two more tax rules 
each year, they will experience all of the adverse effects of ossification 
unless Congress significantly increases the two agencies’ budgets and 
personnel. That seems highly unlikely to happen in the foreseeable 
future given current budgetary and political constraints. 
Some of the adverse effects of requiring the IRS and Treasury to 
comply with the APA are unavoidable. However, certain adverse 
effects may be worth tolerating in order to obtain the advantages of 
the notice-and-comment procedure. One step that might reduce the 
costs of compliance with the APA significantly would be to create a 
situation in which the benefits of the notice-and-comment procedure 
are not overwhelmed by the costs of the procedure. For example, 
Congress might eliminate judicial review of the notice-and-comment 
process. In the tax context, that step can be accomplished easily in a 
manner that is consistent with existing statutes and precedents. 
This article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I describe the ways 
in which courts have added burdensome procedures that are not 
required by the APA for the notice and comment process. In Part II, 
I explain why the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) is better than courts at reviewing the adequacy of agency 
reasons for issuing a rule. In Part III, I explain how courts can 
eliminate judicial review of the adequacy of the reasons IRS gives for 
issuing a rule by applying the traditional broad interpretations of the 
Anti-Injunction Act and the tax exception to the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. 
I.  COURTS HAVE REDEFINED THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
It is easy to trace the path that has led to ossification of the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. APA § 553 requires an 
agency to use a three-step process when it issues a rule.17 It must issue 
a notice of proposed rulemaking, solicit comments from the public in 
response to the notice, and issue a final rule that incorporates a 
concise general statement of the basis and purpose of the rule. The 
APA describes the three steps in the following language: 
 
 16. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 
59, 60–62 (1995).  
 17. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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(b) General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the 
Federal Register . . . . The notice shall include— 
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making 
proceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; 
and 
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved. 
. . . . 
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give 
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making 
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or 
without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the 
relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules 
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.18 
Until 1967, agencies complied with APA § 553 as that provision 
was written. In a typical rulemaking, the agency issued a relatively 
brief notice that complied with § 553(b), received and considered 
comments that were modest in length, and then issued a final rule 
that incorporated a “concise general statement of basis and 
purpose”19 only a few pages long.20 
The agency practice of compliance with APA § 553 as it was 
written ended as a result of a series of court opinions that were issued 
between 1967 and 1973. Those opinions changed the meaning of § 553 
in ways that render it unrecognizable when compared with the 
language of § 553. 
The Supreme Court’s 1967 opinion in Abbott Laboratories v. 
Gardner21 opened the door to a series of lower-court opinions that 
“interpreted” § 553 to mean something dramatically different from 
the simple and efficient decisionmaking process described in the 
APA. In Abbott, the Court announced a new test for determining 
whether a rule is ripe for pre-enforcement review. The Court applied 
for the first time a presumption of reviewability so strong that it 
 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Jack M. Beerman & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 856, 892 (2007).  
 21. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
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trumped the language of statutes.22 Like most regulatory statutes, the 
statute at issue in Abbott explicitly provided a means through which a 
party could seek review of a rule—by challenging its validity in an 
enforcement proceeding initiated by the agency against the party. The 
statute did not authorize a court to engage in pre-enforcement of a 
rule. The Court applied the new presumption of reviewability to 
reverse the normal process for determining whether Congress has 
authorized a court to act. Instead of asking whether Congress 
authorized pre-enforcement review, the Court asked whether there 
was “clear and convincing evidence” that Congress intended to 
preclude pre-enforcement review.23 The Court concluded that the 
presence of a statutory provision that authorized review of a rule in 
an enforcement proceeding and the absence of a statutory provision 
that authorized pre-enforcement review of a rule were not enough to 
satisfy the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard that the Court 
announced to accompany its newly announced presumption in favor 
of pre-enforcement review of rules. Before Abbott, most rules were 
subject to review only in enforcement proceedings. After Abbott, a 
rule is subject to pre-enforcement review if, like most rules, it 
presents a legal issue that is “fit for judicial resolution” and “requires 
an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs’ conduct of their 
affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance.”24 
The stark differences between the review of a rule in an 
enforcement proceeding authorized by Congress and the pre-
enforcement review of a rule authorized by the Court became 
apparent within a few years after the Court issued its opinion in 
Abbott. In the context of an enforcement proceeding, a district court 
would be tasked with reviewing the rule based on the enforcement 
proceeding records. Since agencies usually only initiated enforcement 
proceedings when a target had engaged in conduct that was 
particularly egregious and obviously harmful, the record in such 
proceedings frequently included evidence that the rule was necessary 
to prevent serious harm. As a result, in cases in which the target 
sought review of a rule, the agency was likely to prevail. Rules were 
rarely challenged because a regulated firm knew that it was unlikely 
 
 22. Id. at 140; see generally Nicolas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2014) (discussing the tendency of the courts to invoke the 
presumption of judicial review when reviewing agency actions despite statutory language that 
appears to preclude judicial review). 
 23. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 141.  
 24. Id. at 153. 
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to prevail when it attempted to challenge the validity of the rule in an 
enforcement proceeding. The firm also knew that it was vulnerable to 
serious direct and indirect adverse consequences if it violated the rule 
or challenged the validity of the rule in an enforcement proceeding 
and lost. 
By contrast, any firm that dislikes a rule has an incentive to seek 
pre-enforcement review of the rule because it will suffer no adverse 
effects if it loses. Within a few years, it became apparent that a 
regulated firm also has a much better chance of prevailing in a 
proceeding in which it seeks pre-enforcement review of a rule than 
when it challenges the validity of the same rule in a proceeding to 
enforce it. In most cases, pre-enforcement review takes place in a 
circuit court rather than a district court. The circuit court has an 
understandable desire to have access to some kind of record that it 
can use as the basis for review. It does not have access to the record 
of an enforcement proceeding for that purpose, so it uses a “record” 
that consists of the notice, the comments filed in response to the 
notice, and the “concise general statement” of the rule’s basis and 
purpose that the agency is required to incorporate in the final rule.25 
In Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd,26 one of the 
first pre-enforcement review cases decided after the Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Abbott, the D.C. Circuit stated that it needed 
access to a record sufficient to allow it to engage in pre-enforcement 
review of a rule.27 The court then described the conflict between the 
record that is created when an agency complies with APA § 553 and 
the kind of record the court thought that it needed to engage in pre-
enforcement review of a rule.28 The court resolved that conflict by 
instructing agencies to take the actions needed to develop the kind of 
record the court considered necessary to allow it to engage in review 
rather than to comply with the requirements Congress described in 
APA § 553. In the court’s words: 
[I]t is appropriate for us to remind the Administrator of the ever-
present possibility of judicial review, and to caution against an 
 
 25. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 26. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 27. See id. at 338 (“We do expect that, if the judicial review [required by Congress] is to be 
meaningful, the ‘concise general statement[’] . . . will enable us to see what major issues of 
policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it 
did.”).  
 28. See id. (discussing “differences of emphasis and approach” to the record needed for a 
rule making, as compared to appellate review). 
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overly literal reading of the statutory terms “concise” and “general.” 
These adjectives must be accommodated to the realities of judicial 
scrutiny, which do not contemplate that the court itself will, by a 
laborious examination of the record, formulate in the first instance 
the significant issues faced by the agency and articulate the rationale 
of their resolution. We do not expect the agency to discuss every 
item of fact or opinion included in the submissions made to it in 
informal rule making. We do expect that, if the judicial review which 
Congress has thought it important to provide is to be meaningful, 
the “concise general statement of . . . basis and purpose” mandated 
by section 4 will enable us to see what major issues of policy were 
ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted 
to them as it did.29 
The court went on to hold that the three-page “concise general 
statement of basis and purpose” that the agency had incorporated in 
the rule was sufficient to allow the court to uphold the rule because 
the petitioner did not file detailed and well-supported comments that 
criticized the rule proposed in the notice.30 
The members of the Washington, D.C. Bar immediately 
internalized and acted on the message the D.C. Circuit sent in 
Automotive Parts. Lawyers for regulated firms that disliked a rule 
proposed by an agency began to submit lengthy and detailed 
comments that criticized the rule, often accompanied by consultants’ 
reports that purported to make findings that undermined the basis for 
the rule. Thus, for instance, when the NHTSA proposed another rule 
shortly after its “victory” in Automotive Parts, a trade association that 
disliked the proposed rule submitted lengthy comments that criticized 
in detail every aspect of the agency proposal.31 The comments were 
accompanied by the reports of studies conducted by consulting firms 
retained by the association that purported to find that the proposed 
rule was unnecessary and that its implementation would be costly and 
dangerous. The association prevailed in the pre-enforcement review 
proceeding it initiated based on the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the 
final rule was arbitrary and capricious because the agency had not 
responded adequately to the comments filed by the association that 
were critical of the proposed rule.32 
 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 338–41. 
 31. Nat’l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass’n, Inc. v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 36–40 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
 32. Id. at 40–41. 
PIERCE IN PRINTER PROOF CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2014  5:04 PM 
10 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 64:1 
That pair of D.C. Circuit opinions created an entirely new legal 
environment. Every circuit has followed the lead of the D.C. Circuit 
in holding that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious unless the 
agency responds adequately to all well-supported comments that are 
critical of the rule proposed by the agency, and the Supreme Court’s 
1983 opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.33 has been widely interpreted to 
approve of the D.C. Circuit approach.34 The Supreme Court also 
added a seemingly open-ended duty to consider alternatives to any 
action an agency proposes to take in a rulemaking. Not surprisingly, 
those judicial opinions have created incentives for parties that dislike 
proposed rules to bury an agency with comments that criticize the 
proposed rule and suggest alternatives to the proposed rule. 
Comments on economically significant proposed rules routinely are 
tens of thousands of pages long and are regularly accompanied by 
consultant studies that purport to undermine the bases for the 
proposed rule. Agencies regularly require years to draft the several-
hundred page “concise general statement of basis and purpose” that 
must be incorporated in a rule, and courts reject 30 percent of the 
rules as arbitrary and capricious because the agency did not 
adequately respond to one or more of the voluminous critical 
comments.35 In short, the courts converted the statutory requirement 
for a “concise general statement of basis and purpose” into a judicial 
requirement for a detailed and encyclopedic document that invariably 
spans hundreds of pages. 
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Abbott, 
circuit courts began a similar process of rewriting the APA notice 
requirement. APA § 553 requires an agency to issue a “[g]eneral 
notice” that consists of: 
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making 
proceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; 
and 
 
 33. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 
(1983).  
 34. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4 (5th ed. 
2010) (discussing cases). 
 35. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 83–86 (2011).  
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(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved.36 
As was true of the requirement for a “concise general statement 
of basis and purpose,” before the Court decided Abbott, agencies 
complied with the modest notice requirement in APA § 553 by 
publishing notices that were just a few pages long but that complied 
fully with the language of the APA. That changed as courts redefined 
the requirements of the APA. 
In 1972, the Third Circuit issued the post-Abbott judicial opinion 
that began the process of redefinition of the notice requirement 
Congress created in the APA.37 The court held a notice inadequate 
because it did not inform the public of all of the possible ways in 
which the agency might change the rules it proposed to amend. Other 
circuits soon adopted this demanding method for determining the 
adequacy of a notice, and all circuits now hold that a notice is 
inadequate if the final rule is not a “logical outgrowth” of the notice.38 
The practical effect of the logical-outgrowth test is to require agencies 
to attempt to identify and describe in a notice every conceivable 
version of the final rule the agency might adopt years later.39 
The D.C. Circuit joined in the process of redefining the notice 
requirement a year later. In 1973, the D.C. Circuit rejected an agency 
rule because the rule was based in part on a source of data that the 
agency had not identified in its notice.40 All circuits quickly embraced 
that dramatic judicial expansion of the “general notice” requirement 
that Congress imposed in the APA.41 Circuits courts now hold that 
“[a]n agency commits serious procedural error when it fails to reveal 
portions of the technical basis for a proposed rule in time to allow for 
meaningful commentary”42 and that the notice must provide sufficient 
information to permit “adversarial critique.”43 The practical effect of 
this judicially imposed duty is to require an agency to anticipate—at 
the time it issues a notice—all of the sources of data and analysis that 
 
 36. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).  
 37. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019–20 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 38. PIERCE, supra note 34, § 7.3. 
 39. Beerman & Lawson, supra note 20, at 895–99. 
 40. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 401–02 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 41. PIERCE, supra note 34, § 7.3. 
 42. See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530–31 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(collecting cases). 
 43. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
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it may want to rely on years later when it issues a final rule. The 
agency also must issue a supplemental notice and provide a new 
opportunity to comment if it decides to rely on a source of data or 
analysis that did not become available until after it issued its initial 
notice.44 That is a routine occurrence, since a major rulemaking 
typically requires years to complete. 
Professors Wagner, Barnes, and Peters have accurately described 
the results of the dramatic judicial expansions of the modest 
requirement to issue a “general notice” that Congress imposed in 
APA § 553. The pre-notice part of the rulemaking process now takes 
more than twice as long as the post-notice part of the process because 
“the courts have made it painfully clear that if a rule is to survive 
judicial review, it must be essentially in final form at the proposed 
rule stage.”45 When the judicial expansions of the congressional 
requirement of a “concise general statement of basis and purpose” 
are added to the judicial expansions of the congressional requirement 
of a “general notice” of proposed rulemaking, the judicial version of 
APA § 553 bears no relationship to the requirements imposed by the 
statute. Application of the judicial version of the APA’s requirements 
to thirty-two more tax rules per year—rules issued by agencies that 
already confront enormous resource constraints in their efforts to 
implement the constantly expanding agenda Congress assigns them 
and that already take too long to issue important rules—would have 
devastating effects. 
II.  OIRA IS BETTER THAN COURTS AT REVIEWING RULES 
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
reviews all economically significant rules before they go into effect.46 
Many scholars have described the ways in which OIRA ensures that 
agencies do not overstep the boundaries of their authority and harm 
the economy by engaging in regulation that imposes costs that exceed 
their benefits,47 but OIRA also performs its review function in ways 
that improve the quality of the rulemaking process in other ways. 
 
 44. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
 45. Wendy Wagner et al., supra note 11, at 110. 
 46. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 
601 app. (2012). 
 47. E.g., Patrick A. McGlaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of 
Regulatory Impact Analysis?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 183–91 (2011). 
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As then-professor Justice Breyer explained twenty years ago, 
OIRA has major advantages over courts in performing tasks of this 
type. In his 1993 book, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective 
Risk Regulation, Justice Breyer described in detail why OIRA is 
much better suited to review agency rules than are courts.48 OIRA can 
apply its multidisciplinary expertise and the virtues of bureaucracy to 
rationalize the agency policymaking process.49 
Justice Breyer also contrasted OIRA with courts by illustrating 
some of the many ways in which judicial precedents can have 
unintended adverse effects. For instance, the Supreme Court’s 
holding in State Farm—in which it rejected a rule because an agency 
did not adequately consider an alternative to the rule50—is likely to be 
interpreted and applied to require agencies to waste time and 
resources by engaging in the futile task of attempting “to establish 
procedures to consider thoroughly all alternatives in every case.”51 
More recently, Professors Sally Katzen, Cass Sunstein, and 
Jennifer Nou, all of whom are former OIRA officials, have described 
in detail the many ways in which OIRA ensures that agency rules are 
rational and based on multidisciplinary expertise. Professor Katzen, a 
former OIRA administrator, has described some of her many 
successful efforts to use the OIRA power to review rules as a point of 
entry to allow OIRA to work with agencies to improve the rules they 
issue.52 Professor Sunstein, also a former OIRA administrator, has 
explained that “OIRA helps to collect widely dispersed 
information—information that is held throughout the executive 
branch and by the public as a whole.”53 Professor Nou, formerly a 
legal policy analyst at OIRA, has used her detailed description of the 
many ways in which OIRA improves the rulemaking process as part 
of the basis for her well-supported argument that agencies conducting 
 
 48. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 55–72 (1993). 
 49. Id. at 61–67. 
 50. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983). 
 51. BREYER, supra note 48, at 58; see Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law 
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 393 (1986) (noting the tension between an agency’s ability 
to respond to every comment and the ability of appellate courts to address any argument raised 
at the trial court level). 
 52. Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 
103, 107–08 (2011). 
 53. Cass Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840 (2013). 
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rulemakings should pay more attention to the potential for OIRA 
review than to the potential for judicial review.54 
As Justice Breyer, and Professors Katzen, Sunstein, and Nou 
have explained in detail, the contrast between OIRA review of rules 
and court review of rules is stark. OIRA applies a multidisciplinary 
approach that draws on numerous sources of expertise to engage in 
an intense and continuous process of communication with an agency. 
Additionally, the approach is designed to identify flaws in an agency 
rule and to assist the agency in identifying and implementing 
beneficial changes to the rule before it is published. In most cases, 
that review process is completed within ninety days.55 By contrast, a 
reviewing court has no access to relevant expertise beyond its law 
clerks, it engages in a review process that requires over a year to 
complete, and it has extremely limited means of communicating with 
an agency. If the reviewing court identifies a flaw in an agency rule, it 
remands the rule. In many cases, the agency must then begin a new 
rulemaking process that takes many more years to complete.56 
Moreover, as Justice Breyer has explained, the opinion in which the 
court rejects the agency rule is often misunderstood by other courts 
and by agencies. For instance, the Supreme Court’s famous opinion in 
State Farm—in which it rejected an agency decision in a rulemaking 
because the agency did not adequately consider an alternative to the 
action it took57—has been widely interpreted to require every agency 
to engage in exhaustive discussion of every alternative to every action 
it considers in every rulemaking, thereby adding to the high cost and 
delay of the rulemaking process.58 
OIRA review is also far more likely than judicial review to 
further the values of democracy. In its landmark opinion in Chevron 
 
 54. See generally Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013) (discussing the implications of presidential review for executive 
agencies during the rulemaking process). 
 55. Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1847. 
 56. See Nou, supra note 54, at 1756–57 (emphasizing the exhaustive nature of the agency 
rulemaking process and the fact that most rules result from years of initial research).  
 57. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–48 
(1983) (finding that the most apparent reason an agency decision was arbitrary and capricious 
was that agency’s failure to provide a cogent explanation for its exercise of rulemaking 
discretion). 
 58. See BREYER, supra note 48, at 58 (indicating that judicial decisions that require 
consideration of policy alternatives can lead to the development of agency procedures that 
require consideration of “all alternatives in every case”).  
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U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,59 the Court 
held that reviewing courts must uphold any reasonable agency 
interpretation of ambiguous language in an agency administered 
statute. The Court explained why courts must defer to agencies in the 
policy making process: 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political 
branch of the Government . . . . In contrast, an agency to which 
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within 
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While 
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the 
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did 
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency 
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities.60 
That reasoning also supports substitution of OIRA review of 
rules for judicial review of rules. The Administrator of OIRA 
invariably is someone who communicates regularly with the 
President. OIRA review reflects “the incumbent administration’s 
views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”61 Katzen has often 
observed in her writings that the head of OIRA does what the 
President requires. 
Most federal agencies are mission-oriented. For instance, the 
EPA’s staff is primarily dedicated to improving air and water quality. 
That is an institutional characteristic that has many good effects, but 
it can also have adverse effects. Agencies tend to make decisions with 
tunnel vision. There are many examples of circumstances in which 
Presidential involvement in a rulemaking process at the EPA has 
yielded a rule that incorporates important considerations beyond 
those a special purpose agency is likely to consider. A particularly 
illustrative example is the EPA’s decision during the Carter 
Administration to set the sulfur dioxide emissions limit at a level that 
disappointed many of the environmental advocacy groups that 
 
 59. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 60. Id. at 865–66. 
 61. Id. at 865. 
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comprise the EPA’s most reliable supporters.62 The EPA’s decision 
was influenced by meetings between its administrator and the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisors, the Secretary of Energy, 
the majority leader of the Senate, and the President.63 Those meetings 
ensured that the EPA decision incorporated consideration of factors 
like the effects of the potential alternative decisions on national 
security, international relations, inflation, employment, and economic 
growth. D.C. Circuit Judge Wald wisely rejected environmental 
groups’ claims that the meetings were inappropriate and unlawful. 
She concluded instead that meetings between agency decisionmakers 
and their political superiors are essential to the democratic legitimacy 
of the agency rulemaking process.64 
III.  COURTS CAN AND SHOULD REFUSE TO REVIEW THE 
ADEQUACY OF AGENCY EXPLANATIONS FOR TAX RULES 
My arguments to substitute OIRA review for judicial review of 
rules apply to all rules issued by all agencies. I recognize, however, 
that I am unlikely to be successful in persuading courts to stop 
engaging in pre-enforcement review of most rules issued by most 
agencies. That would require the Supreme Court to issue opinions 
that reduce the strength of the presumption in favor of pre-
enforcement review and overturn the many precedents in which 
courts have dramatically expanded the requirements of APA § 553.65 I 
hope the Supreme Court takes those actions, but it is unlikely to do so 
in the near future. 
Fortunately, it is easy for the courts to create the kind of legal 
environment I prefer in the tax context. Courts need merely to apply 
existing precedents. Tax rules have always differed from all other 
rules because of two statutes: the Anti-Injunction Act66 (AIA) and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA).67 The AIA provides that “no suit 
 
 62. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the parties in 
this case include both the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund). 
 63. See id. at 387–91 (discussing the extensive meetings between the EPA and the high-
level government officials following the close of the official comments period for the EPA’s 
proposed regulatory change).  
 64. See id. at 405–08 (finding that “the authority of the President to control and supervise 
executive policymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is 
demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking”). 
 65. See supra notes 21–44 and accompanying text.  
 66. The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2012). 
 67. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012). 
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for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax 
shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such 
person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.”68 The 
purpose of the AIA is “to permit the United States to assess and 
collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to 
require that the legal right to the disputed sums to be determined in a 
suit for refund.”69 The DJA, on the other hand, authorizes courts to 
issue declaratory judgments, but it exempts from its scope suits “with 
respect to Federal taxes.”70 Courts interpret the AIA and the 
exemption in the DJA to have the same purpose and scope.71 
The Court attached great significance to the DJA when it 
created and applied its presumption in favor of pre-enforcement 
review of rules in Abbott. The Court justified its new presumption 
with the assertion that the promulgation of a rule that requires 
petitioners to change their behavior “puts petitioners in a dilemma 
that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to 
ameliorate.”72 The Court referred to the DJA again when it 
announced the holding of the case: 
Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and 
where a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in 
the plaintiffs’ conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached 
to noncompliance, access to the courts under the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act must be 
permitted, absent a statutory bar or some other unusual 
circumstance, neither of which appears here.73 
Consistent with the language and reasoning in Abbott, courts 
have long held that rules “with respect to Federal taxes” are not 
subject to the pre-enforcement review authorized in Abbott because 
the AIA and the tax exemption in the DJA qualify as “statutory bars” 
to such suits. Sitting en banc, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed that 
interpretation of the two acts in a 2011 opinion in which it held that 
pre-enforcement review was available because the IRS rule was not a 
 
 68. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). 
 69. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  
 71. See Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 727–28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (finding 
that precedent interprets the AIA and the DJA as coterminous).  
 72. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967). 
 73. Id. at 153. 
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rule “with respect to Federal taxes.”74 The court emphasized the 
narrowness of its holding and the breadth of the prohibition on pre-
enforcement review of tax rules: “in the tax context, the only APA 
suits subject to review would be those cases pertaining to final agency 
action unrelated to tax assessment and collection.”75 
Similarly, in its 2012 opinion in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,76 the Supreme Court recognized that 
the AIA bars pre-enforcement review of rules that relate to 
“assessment or collection of any tax.”77 Nonetheless, the Court held 
that courts could engage in pre-enforcement review of the individual 
mandate in the Affordable Care Act because Congress had explicitly 
characterized the only sanction available to enforce the mandate as a 
“penalty” rather than a tax.78 
CONCLUSION 
My goal is simple. I want to keep courts out of the process of 
determining whether an IRS or Treasury explanation of a tax rule is 
sufficient to comply with the APA requirement of a “concise general 
statement of basis and purpose” for a tax rule and the process of 
determining whether an IRS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is 
adequate. Fortunately, all the courts must do to further this goal is 
adhere to a long line of precedents that are based on the plain 
language of two statutes. 
I agree with the other participants in the 2014 Administrative 
Law Symposium that the courts should “take administrative law to 
tax” by holding that the IRS and Treasury must comply with the 
notice-and-comment requirements of APA when they issue tax rules. 
Yet I differ with the other participants by disagreeing with the view 
that the courts should apply to such rules the judicial interpretations 
of “notice” and “concise general statement of basis and purpose” that 
have had the effect of introducing massive time and resource-
consuming inefficiencies into the rulemaking process in contexts 
 
 74. See Cohen, 650 F.3d at 730, 736 (“This suit is not about the excise tax, its assessment, or 
its illegal collection. Nor is it about the money owed to taxpayers. . . . As a result, we have 
federal question jurisdiction, and neither the AIA nor the DJA provide a limitation.”).  
 75. Id. at 733 (emphasis added). 
 76. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 77. See id. at 2582 (emphasis added) (finding that the AIA ordinarily allows taxes to be 
challenged only after they have been collected). 
 78. See id. at 2584 (holding that because the penalty for failure to comply with the 
individual mandate is not treated as a tax, the AIA does not apply). 
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other than tax. The nation simply cannot afford to allow courts to 
delay interminably the process of issuing tax rules, thereby to so 
“interrupt the free flow of revenues as to jeopardize the Nation’s 
fiscal stability” in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.79 
 
 
 79. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 769 (1974).  
